Yeah, absolutely. Thanks, Matt. I mean, this week sees quickfire central bank meetings in developed markets, central bank meetings where the policy decisions have material implications for yield curves and for currency markets both into year end and through the course of next year. You could even say that it's central bank pantomime season, and it's not clear yet whether we'll get magic beans, golden eggs or indeed whether our carriages will turn into pumpkins, but it should prove fascinating viewing nonetheless.

In the UK, we get the October employment data on Tuesday and the all important MPC meeting on Thursday. Regular followers will know that we've been consistent in our view of a February rate lift off from the Bank of England, and I suppose you could say that this delay, relative to market pricing at least, amounts to a Christmas gift from Threadneedle Street. From a policy perspective we are comfortable with the assessment that the underlying inflation dynamic warrants rate hikes through 2022. To paraphrase Mervyn King's viewpoint, not least to manage down aggregate demand in line with the lower aggregate supply both through Covid and through Brexit related supply chain disruptions. We're also comfortable with the improved assessment of the post furlough labour market backdrop, as it's likely clearly demonstrated early this week. However, last week's GDP data for October was a little disappointing and likely highlight the Bank of England's concerns over the fragility of the near-term growth outlook and thus sensitivity to rate hikes. The breakdown of the October GDP showed services rebound but concentrated in the public services, doctors appointments and the like - a more concerning picture in the private sector, hotels and restaurants in particular. Thus, this further questioning consumer demand. Indeed, the Bank of England tend to look at November, December and January together to gauge consumer demand what with Black Friday, Christmas and January sales. A further argument for waiting until February. add in Omicron and with its likely complex inflation impact, we see demand uncertainties as enough for the Bank of England to hold off until its quarterly forecasts in February.

Also on Thursday, the ECB is back in the spotlight. At a September meeting, the ECB pushed a decision on the end of the programme or its transition to APP to the December meeting, at least in part, we're led to believe due to divergent views on the governing council. A divergence that was potentially a factor in the resignation of the hawkish anchor on the governing council. Now, as the December meeting is upon us, it's likely that these divergences are even greater. At one end of the spectrum, Germany has six percent inflation output broadly back to pre-COVID levels and debt at moderate levels, particularly given the uncertainties we've faced of late. Even with the proposed 60 billion euro stimulus plan from the new Traffic Light Coalition. Now, pressure to cease further monetary accommodation is thus there from the German contingent. On the other end of the spectrum, the southern states, debt dynamics are much worse even accounting for the Recovery Resilience Fund and the wealth distribution therein - and the prospect of the removal of ECB support for peripheral spreads is a major concern. Especially in the context of a potential Omicron wave this winter. So a difficult balancing act to find agreement on the governing council. Indeed it is possible that that decision may even be delayed again. But delay will not help and certainly not resolve the issue of divergence within the eurozone and the monetary policy headache that loom beyond the December meeting.

So fascinating viewing from the Bank of England and the ECB meetings. But the headline act is undoubtedly the December FOMC. Over recent weeks, much of the focus has been on The Chair's re-nomination and hawkish pivot and the inference of an impending acceleration of the QE taper narrative that has driven further flattening of the US curve. And while we're advocates of the front end repricing, we're also more inclined to think that the singular focus on the Fed's reaction function to near term inflation and thus earlier rate hikes, but still relatively few and thus a low terminal rate, understate the underlying assessment of very strong US growth. In the US there are clear signs of excess demand, not just a factor in inflation. Furthermore, it is important to frame the monetary normalisation debate around the emergency settings that were a function of the acute growth in liquidity conditions of March 2020. Not to mention the unprecedented fiscal stimulus. On this basis, we think that the expedited pace of taper is only a small part of the December FOMC minutes. The updated growth forecasts, long term inflation projections and expectations of the US terminal rate are equally important, if not more so for the yield curve and for the dollar.